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Cosmogony 101 Lab, Final Exam Project and Notes "Contra Liberum Arbitrium"

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Hereafter are Five variants of the same Cosmogony 101 Lab project followed by my notes "Against Freewill" (with half-hearted apologies to creatures offended by the foregoing).

Please note that I have NOT posted within a Monotheism DIR. Be forewarned, though, respond with caution. Bring your own aluminum or tin foil hats and shields.:D
 
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Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Cosmogony 101 (Version A)

Suppose you are a supernatural being or a student taking a laboratory course in Cosmogony 101 at some faraway university and you have decided to create a universe that consists of moving things.

(1) You must first create space and time, since motion consists of being located somewhere in space at some time and somewhere else in space at other times.

(2) Both space and time must be metric spaces, so that you can speak of distances between parts of space and distances between parts of time and divide one by the other and compute speeds for your moving objects.

(3) A metric space is a set the elements of which are "points" in the case of space and "instants" in the case of time and in either case have a size of zero and have no parts.

(4) Your moving objects, in order to occupy space, must occupy either single points of space or sets containing many points (two or more, maybe infinitely many, maybe more than merely infinitely many). In the latter case, however, they have parts, and, in particular, they have smallest and indivisible parts that occupy single points. Thus your moving objects must either be particles, objects that occupy exactly one point of space at each instant of time at which they exist, or else sets of many such particles (two or more). Thus when you get around to making your moving objects, all you will make will be moving particles. Whatever other moving objects there are will be sets of particles.

(5) Now suppose that your particles move at different speeds. There will then be no way to say what the speed of any one of them is. Since you cannot see space and can see only the particles, the best that you will be able to do will be to say that this particle has a relative speed of such-and-such with respect to that particle, but there will be no definite and non-arbitrary way to break this relative motion down into so much motion of particle A and so much motion of particle B. The notion that any one particle even has any such property as a speed that is just its own speed would, however, under such circumstances, be incoherent, as, then, would the notion that the speed of one particle is different from the speed of some other particle. The hypothesis that the particles have different speeds thus implies its own senselessness and cannot be true. The alternative is that all the particles have the same speed.

(6) Suppose now that the speed of all particles varies with the passage of time. Again there would be no way to say what this speed is. There would be no way to distinguish between a process that happened at a constant rate and one that did not. There would be no way to distinguish between a clock that ticked off time at a constant rate and one that did not. But without a clock that ticks at a rate that is guaranteed to be constant, the notion of time needed for computing a speed is lacking and again there is no sense in saying that the particles have one speed rather than some other speed. The notion that there is some quantity which is the speed of the particles is, under such circumstances, incoherent, and with it the notion that this speed varies. The hypothesis that the particles have a variable speed thus implies its own senselessness and cannot be true. The alternative is that the speed of the particles is constant.

(7) Thus you must create nothing but particles and these must all have the same constant speed. Otherwise, your notion of a universe of moving objects is incoherent.

(8) It is clear now that the particles must be particles not only in the sense of being appropriately small (occupying one point at a time), but also in the sense of being separated each from any other by empty space, for a geometrically solid object has no freedom to move in such a way that each point-occupying part of it moves at the same constant speed (other than that the entire object move at that speed, in a constant direction, forever – but there are no such objects).

(9) There must be no more than countably many particles, for more than that many could get together to form an impossible geometrically solid object. On the other hand, since the universe is infinitely large (assuming that space is Euclidean), there must be infinitely many particles, since fewer would either clump together in a finite region of space or disperse until there were no combinations of them. Since there are dispersive as well as aggregative processes going on, we can assume that any region of space of finite volume contains only finitely many particles (possibly none if the region is sufficiently small).

(10) The velocity of a finite set of particles is v = (v1 + ... + vn)/n, or perhaps v = (m1v1 + ... + mnvn)/(m1 + ... + mn), where n is the number of particles, the vi are their velocities and the mi are their masses. Since vectors partially cancel each other when they add unless they are parallel, this velocity can have any magnitude from and including 0 up to and including c, though it has the speed c only in case each of the added vectors is parallel to each of the others, and this speed can change as the directions in which the constituent particles move change.

This explains why we live in a world that consists of some very small things that move all at the constant speed c, while all large things move at variable speeds that are less than c, and maybe zero.
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Cosmogony 101 (Version B)

Suppose that you are a supernatural entity (or a student in a Cosmogony 101 lab course at some far away university) and you have determined (or been assigned) to create an interesting universe. You will want things to move about, since a static universe is boring. So you will first create space and time, so that your moving things, when you get around to them, will have some place to move about in and some time during which to move about. This space will be a set of points, each some distance from each, and your time will be a set of instants, also each some (temporal) distance from each. That way you can divide the distance in space that something has moved by the length of time that it took it to move that far and compute a speed, without which there will hardly be any sense to your notion of motion. So now you are ready to create some moving things. Can you create things that are larger than points? Not really, since any such thing will actually be a set of many things each of which occupies just one point, since your space and any part of it is a set of points. So you will create only particles, things that occupy just one point at a time, and you will make larger things merely by putting many of the small things close to each other. Now, then, how fast should your particles travel? They have to move, or else the things that are many of them will not move. Can you make them travel at all different speeds? No, you cannot. If they traveled at different speeds, then there would be no way to distinguish a co-ordinate system for space from an inertial system, and hence no way to say meaningfully which of the particles was moving and how fast, and hence no sense in the proposition that they move at different speeds. So "moving at different speeds" implies its own senselessness and hence is not logically possible. The alternative is to make all the particles have the same speed. Can this speed vary? Again, no. If the speed varied then there would be no way to distinguish a uniform clock from a non-uniform clock and hence there would again be no way to say how fast the particles were moving and hence no sense in the proposition that they move at a variable speed. So"moving at a variable speed" implies its own senselessness and hence is not logically possible. The alternative is to make all the particles have a constant speed. So, combining, they must all have the same constant speed. Choose a speed. Create your particles. Wow! Look at tnem go! But, lo!, they are all moving on straight lines. Borrrrring! Hey, here’s a good idea. Make them interact with each other, so that their paths curve when they get close to each other. Ah! That’s much better! You have created an interesting universe. It consists of nothing but particles all moving at the constant speed c, but, since their paths curve when they are close to each other, they go into orbit around each other and form various stable orbital systems. These too interact with each other (since they are made of particles that do) and combine to form even larger things. Look! Some of those larger things are figuring out how it all works!
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Cosmogony 101 (Version C)

Suppose that you are a supernatural being (or a freshman taking a laboratory course in Cosmogony 101 at some far away university) and you have determined to create a universe. You like to watch sparrows fall, so you have decided to create a universe of things that move.

First, then, you will create a space for them to move about in. Next, you will create a time that passes so things have some time during which to move.

So that some things can move fast and others slow, you need a metric concept of speed. Your space, then, is a metric space, consisting of points each some spatial distance from each, each such distance being r meters for some nonnegative real number r. Similarly, your time is a metric space, consisting of instants each some temporal distance from each, each such distance being t seconds for some nonnegative real number r. That way you can compute speeds as (s meters)/(t seconds) = s/t meters per second.

Having laid in the space and time needed for things that move, you are now ready to create the moving things. These will, at each instant of time, occupy some part of space. You cannot create any large things without creating their small parts, and, indeed, once you have created all the parts there is nothing left to do to create the thing itself. So you will necessarily create only moving things that occupy exactly one point of space at any given instant of time, for anything that occupies two or more points at once will have parts that do not and will consist entirely of these parts.

Can you create your particles in such a way that they move at variable or at different speeds? No, you cannot. If the particles moved at different speeds, then there would be no way to say which of them was moving or how fast. The best that you could do would be to say that this one is moving at such and such a relative speed with respect to that one, but there would be no way to split this relative motion up and say how much of it was the motion of one particle and how much of it was the motion of the other and how much of the motion not thus accounted for was a motion that the two particles had in common. But if there is no way to assign specific speeds to each particle, then it does not make sense to say that any one particle even has any such property as a speed that is the speed of that particle, and then it makes no sense to say that two particles have different speeds. The proposition that the particles have different speeds thus implies its own senselessness, so no such universe is logically possible. The alternative is to give all particles the same speed.

Similarly, if the particles had variable speeds then there would be no way to tell a uniform clock from a non-uniform clock, no way even to make such a distinction, and again no sense in the proposition that particles have a speed or have a variable speed. The proposition that the particles have variable speeds thus implies its own senselessness, so no such universe is logically possible. The alternative is to give all particles a constant speed.

Putting the two arguments together, you are forced to give all particles the same constant speed. No other kind of universe consisting of moving things makes any sense.

Our universe is such a universe. The particles that go more or less in straight lines thus propagate through space at a certain speed, a constant speed, and a speed that is the same for all of them. These are the particles that collectively constitute the material substance known as ‘light’. The other material substances are composed of the same particles, all moving at the same constant speed, but in paths that resemble circles more than straight lines, so that collections of them are typically either at rest or meandering about rather slowly rather than propagating through space at the speed of light.
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Cosmogony 101 (Version D)

Suppose you are a supernatural entity and you are determined to create a physical universe. You want something interesting, so you determine to make a bunch of things that are moving about. If they do not already exist (in which case where are you and when are you thinking about this?), create a space for the things to move about in and a time that will pass while they move about. Now you are ready to make the moving objects. You can't make a universe the elements of which are larger than points, since anything that is located at a set of two or more points has parts and is therefore a subset but not an element of the universe. So what you will make is a set of physical objects each of which occupies exactly one point, though, since they are moving (the particles will have to move or else nothing will), a different point at different instants of time. Can the particles move at different speeds? Obviously not, since then it will be impossible to assign any specific speed to any of them, and the proposition that their speeds are different will no longer make any sense. Thus this proposition, which implies its own senselessness, cannot be true. So make the particles all move at the same speed. Can the particles move at a variable speed? Obviously not, since then it will be impossible to assign any specific speed to them at any given time, and the proposition that their speeds are variable will no longer make any sense. Thus this proposition, which implies its own senselessness, cannot be true. So make the particles all move at the same constant speed. Does it matter what speed? No, the question doesn't even make any sense, since there is nothing that exists yet that can distinguish one speed from any other. Say "Let there be light" now and there will be light and it will be good. Well, pretty boring actually. It's all going in straight lines. Nothing interesting ever happens. Why don't you make up some sort of rule that causes the particles to have non-zero forces that are strong when they come close to each other? There! That's better. Now the little buggers are going into orbit about each other and forming all kinds of complicated things that move at arbitrary and variable speeds that are any speed less than the speed at which their constituent particles move. This could be interesting to watch for the rest of eternity. Do you wonder if these particles will ever form a machine that will figure out how the whole gizmo works?
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Cosmogony 101 (Version E)

1) In order to define the motion of physical objects, there must be a space and there must be a time and this space and this time must be metric spaces, so that we can divide a distance in space by a distance in time and compute a speed.

2) It follows that the physical universe is a set of particles each of which occupies exactly one point of space at any instant of time. This is because any physical object that occupied two or more points at any instant of time would have parts at each of those points and hence would be a subset but not an element of the physical universe.

3) If the particles of which the universe necessarily consists moved at different speeds, then there would be no way to say how fast any one of them was moving. The best that we could do would be to say that this one had a relative speed of thus and so with respect to that one. There would be no way to distinguish a co-ordinate system for space from a moving spatial reference frame. There would be no standard of absolute rest or of absolute motion. However, if there is no way to assign some specific speed to each particle, then the hypotheses that the particles move at different speeds is not a coherent proposition. Thus this proposition implies its own senselessness and therefore could not possibly be a true proposition. The only alternative is that all the particles move at the same speed.

4) If the particles of which the universe consists moved at a variable speed, then there would be no way to say how fast they were moving at any time. There would be no way to distinguish a uniform clock from a non-uniform clock. However, if there is no way to assign some specific speed to the particles, then the hypotheses that the particles move at a variable speed is not a coherent proposition. Thus this proposition implies its own senselessness and therefore could not possibly be a true proposition. The only alternative is that all the particles move at a constant speed.

5) Summarizing, either the physical universe is a set of particles all of which move at the same constant speed or there is no possibility of explaining what is meant by the term "a moving object."

6) But the physical universe contains moving objects. Therefore, either the universe does not make any sense or else it is a set of particles all of which move at the same constant speed. I now propose that we reject the first alternative and adopt the second as a working hypothesis.

7) It now follows that there is empty space, for the alternative, that each point of space contains a particle at each instant of time, would not allow the particles to move all at the same constant speed. Linear continua, strings, are not impossible, but a model that is simpler and thus worthy of being investigated first is that each particle is always completely surrounded by empty space.

8) It now follows also that there is action at a distance. For if the particles did not interact with each other then each particle would move along a straight line, all at some one speed. But the universe is not like that. So the particles interact with each other. However, since there is nothing but empty space between each particles and its nearest neighbors, they interact with each other in spite of their being separated from each other by empty space.

9) It is not necessary to any of the above reasoning that space and time be Euclidean metric spaces, but that would be the simplest assumption to make and hence the one to investigate first. There is at present no evidence to the contrary. Similarly, we may as well assume that space is three-dimensional and time is linear.
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Notes Contra Liberum Arbitrium (Against Freewill)

1. There's a big difference between whether the universe is a machine and whether human beings can predict what that machine will do. The inability to make accurate measurements does not imply that the things that we can measure only to so many decimal places are essentially indeterminate. The inability to make accurate predictions, either because the input data are inexact or because the equations are too complicated to solve, does not imply that the world is probabilistic rather than deterministic.

2. I recently began reading Prof. Dr. Joaquim P. Marques de Sá's book: "CHANCE: The Life of Games & the Game of Life" (Springer-Verlag; Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008), in which Professor Marques de Sá wrote:

"If there were no phenomena with unforeseeable outcomes, phenomena with an element of chance, all temporal cause–effect sequences would be completely deterministic. In this way, with sufficient information, the events of our daily lives would be totally predictable, whether it be the time of arrival of the train tomorrow or the precise nature of what one will be doing at 5.30 pm on 1 April three years from now."


3. The Professor seems to be saying, in the first sentence, that a set of phenomena (i.e. events) in which one or more events take place before and lead to other necessary, inescapably unavoidable results is "a deterministic sequence." Moreover, someone who has sufficient information about the set of events and the things involved in each event could foresee (i.e. predict) the final outcome(s) of the series of events.

A truly chance, or random event, then, would be an event that is not foreseeable/predictable to a person who has complete knowledge about the things involved in the set of events and their temporal order.

Suppose a set of events takes place and suppose that you know what was involved in each event and the order of the events, i.e. you have sufficient information about the set of events, and suppose that I don't have all the facts or that, even given all the facts, I am confused about how they are connected and/or about their order. You, being well-informed, could predict the final result and would call the sequence of events deterministic, while I could only guess at the final result and would plead ignorance "because there's just too much luck involved in the events to be able to predict the final result with certainty." Is a final event in the set of events deterministic or a matter of chance and luck?

Suppose, given the same set of events in the previous example, neither you nor I have sufficient information to predict the final result with absolute certainty. Would a final event in the set, that you could have predicted if you had had sufficient information become a lucky or unlucky result just because you don't have sufficient information? I think not.




@KelseyR , here's a "nudge" for ya, kiddo.

 
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dingdao

The eternal Tao cannot be told - Tao Te Ching
More words makes the target larger.

It's going to take more then logic to "disprove" Free Will.

The problem is that Free Will has never been proven.
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
More words makes the target larger.

I don't understand what that means.

It's going to take more then logic to "disprove" Free Will.

"More than logic to 'disprove' Free Will"? Like what? A baseball bat?

The problem is that Free Will has never been proven.

I may be naive, but it seems that one could go a long way toward eliminating any opposition to the notion of Free Will by disproving its opposite, i.e. determinism, no? How do we go about disproving the alternatives to Free Will?
  1. First question: What are all the possible alternatives to "Free Will" in an infinitely large, eternally functioning cosmos?
  2. Second question: For each of all the possible alternatives, what would have be true--at least once, if not more often--in order to disprove the alternative to "Free Will"?
 

shunyadragon

shunyadragon
Premium Member
I would not take this course on Cosmology 101. The primary first flaw is not considering the role of Chaos Theory that demonstrates that the variation of the outcome of cause and effect events in the macro-world are explained by fractal math. The vague of words such as 'chance' does not help the reference. Even though the range of possible outcomes is limited by the Laws of Nature they are not rigidly determined. The predictability of the chain of future events remains limited in this way, and the degree of Free Will in this scenario remains unknown.
 

dingdao

The eternal Tao cannot be told - Tao Te Ching
I don't understand what that means.

"More than logic to 'disprove' Free Will"? Like what? A baseball bat?

I may be naive, but it seems that one could go a long way toward eliminating any opposition to the notion of Free Will by disproving its opposite, i.e. determinism, no? How do we go about disproving the alternatives to Free Will?
  1. First question: What are all the possible alternatives to "Free Will" in an infinitely large, eternally functioning cosmos?
  2. Second question: For each of all the possible alternatives, what would have be true--at least once, if not more often--in order to disprove the alternative to "Free Will"?
Logic
Matematical Logic can prove a lot. The only problem is that you need to show examples.
Philosophical Logic may look like you are proving something, but the larger your argument becomes, the more likely it is to have a serious flaw. Your argument may actually ignore a problem that will eventually sink your thesis.

The ancient Greeks were supposed to be great philosophers, but they got nowhere because they did not do any experiments.

We just assume we have Free Will. How about this: It changes between Free Will and something else, for the sake of argument, limited predestination depending on the circumstance and you never know the difference.
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Philosophical Logic may look like you are proving something, but the larger your argument becomes, the more likely it is to have a serious flaw. Your argument may actually ignore a problem that will eventually sink your thesis.

I realize that I'm playing your game of "pin the tail on the donkey" here, but your hint seems to suggest that the first seven posts in this thread are more likely have a serious flaw than, say, just one of the Variants and my 7th post. Okay. How's this:
  1. The cosmos consists of objects moving through Space.
  2. At any particular instant in Time, all (as in 100%) of the objects have (a) specific locations in Space and (b) positions relative to each other.
  3. At a particular instant in Time which is different than the preceding instant of Time, all (again, as in 100%) of the objects have (a) specific locations in Space and (b) positions relative to each other.
  4. The objects' specific locations in Space and positions relative to each other at Time1 (in #2) and the very same objects' specific locations in Space and positions relative to each other at Time2 (in #3) will not be the same, because all of the little buggers are in constant motion.
  5. Because Time1 and Time2 are not the same instant, Time1 and Time2 will have a definite chronological order relative to each other: i.e. one will precede the other, the other will follow the one.
Given the cosmos briefly described in 1 through 5, what additional rule, factor, element, or assumption does it need in order to be a completely deterministic entity?
And what, when it is a recognizable deterministic entity, other rule, factor, element, or assumption would it need in order for "free will" to be a meaningful concept in the deterministic entity?
And, finally (for the moment), do you think it makes sense to speak of the cosmos as (a) an intermittently deterministic and non-deterministic entity in which "free will" might be a meaningful concept, or (b) a deterministic entity in part and a non-deterministic entity in remainder?
 
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Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
We just assume we have Free Will. How about this: It changes between Free Will and something else, for the sake of argument, limited predestination depending on the circumstance and you never know the difference.

I suppose, for the sake of argument, that, in spite of your willingness to say, categorically, "We just assume we have Free Will", that you don't want to be bound by that assumption and, rather, want to be cautiously "reasonable" and therefore now offer an "olive branch" and a compromise alternative to your initial assumption, in which the cosmos flips back and forth between predestined events and random, free variable events, with the result that we never know the difference and are able to live out our brief lives in blissful ignorance of the difference. Is that what you're proposing?

Because, if that is what you're proposing, I propose the following counter-offer: that we recognize that the whole cosmos, infinite and without beginng or end, is a completely and permanently deterministic entity at its most fundamental level, but by the time parts of the cosmos combine and interact and form human beings, at that level we're kind of clueless and cling to wishful thinking, because the idea of not having any personal, intentional influence in the cosmos scares the bejeezus out of us?
 
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dybmh

דניאל יוסף בן מאיר הירש
OK. I read all 5 Cosmology 101 variants. And the footnotes. What sort of feedback are you looking for?
 

Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
OK. I read all 5 Cosmology 101 variants. And the footnotes. What sort of feedback are you looking for?

Semi-civil comments, if you got any. One and only one statement of irreconcilable difference, if you feel like you have to. No feedback, if you have none. That thread is one of the two or so remaining agenda items I've had on my mind on and off for some time....just figured RF is the place to do it. Fully expecting minimal acknowledgement and 99% of that negative.

I'm not a Mormon, but, whether they like it or not, their theology requires an infinitely large, eternal cosmos without beginning or end. I'm going to point that out to a couple of them pretty soon.
 

dybmh

דניאל יוסף בן מאיר הירש
Here's a few of my thoughts; I think the most important ones. I hope they are helpful.

Comments on the Cosmology 101 variants:


1) Each one of the variants makes a claim that all particles must be moving at a constant speed. The logical reasoning for this seemed a little weak. It's all based on the inability to measure and maintain order among the particles without a single reference point? Am I misunderstanding? However, the single reference point is the creator, the cosmology student in the lab. The speed of all the particles could be measured and maintained in an orderly manner by using the creator as the reference.

2) Each of the Cosmology 101 variants assumes that there is only one type of particle. Creation in the lab could contain multiple, potentially infinite, different types of particles. Each of these types of particles could have their own distinct properties. Some of those properties could introduce a level of non-deterministic behavior.

3) And finally, there was some discussion of the speed of light as a universal maximum. I'm not 100% sure of the progress, but there is the possibility that the speed of light is not a universal maximum. I can look it up if you wish. The discovery was posted here not too long ago. The data was still being verified, and more experiments were needed to confirm that the behavior was repeatable. I'm not sure how important that is to your over-all thesis. But, maybe look into it, and adjust the Cosmology 101 variants to reflect the latest greatest research on the speed of light (c).

Comments on Notes Contra FreeWill:

I did not see the connection between the Cosmology 101 variants and the Notes Contra FreeWill. Could be me... I tried re-reading it now, and I still don't see the connection. Are Cosmology 101 variants supposed to be connected to the Notes Contra FreeWill? If so, that part may need some additional logical linkages. It could be that my brain had come up with a few questions along the way, and so, by the time I got to the Notes Contra FreeWill, you ( the author ), had needed me ( the reader ) to be at the same place in the logical chain in order to see the connection between the Cosmology 101 variants and the Notes Contra FreeWill. Perhaps shoring up the arguments in the Cosmology 101 variants will help readers like me see the connection to the Notes Contra FreeWill? I don't know.

Comments on Style:

1) I agree with @dingdao. My mantra when writing something like this is, "When in Doubt, Cut it Out".

2) I prefer journalistic writing. That means put the conclusion first. All the most important material goes first. All the strongest arguments go first. I don't like to read something that winds me through a series of logical examples and puts the conclusion at the end. That's my preference. Here's how I remember it... This may sound weird, but, First tell me what you're going to tell me. (That's the conclusion.) Then tell me what I need to know. (These are your best arguments.) Then at the end, tell me what you told me. (This is a restatement of the conclusion from the beginning with a little twist to make it interesting.) It sounds redundant. But my opinion, the result is clarity. Your reader knows exactly what you want to say.

3) Don't be shy about telling me why this information is important. If that was included in Cosmology 101 variants and the Notes Contra Freewill, I missed it, my friend. I'm sorry. I think it would be helpful for me, if there was a whole paragraph explaining why this information is important. Maybe it would explain the target audience for these words?

... ...

Thoughts?
 
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Terry Sampson

Well-Known Member
Good Lord, amigo. You gave me a serious and mighty fine response, .. far beyond what I expected from anyone. Thank you, sincerely. I'll parse it and respond accordingly, albeit not as promptly as you.
 

Skwim

Veteran Member
Notes Contra Liberum Arbitrium (Against Freewill)

1. There's a big difference between whether the universe is a machine and whether human beings can predict what that machine will do. The inability to make accurate measurements does not imply that the things that we can measure only to so many decimal places are essentially indeterminate. The inability to make accurate predictions, either because the input data are inexact or because the equations are too complicated to solve, does not imply that the world is probabilistic rather than deterministic.

2. I recently began reading Prof. Dr. Joaquim P. Marques de Sá's book: "CHANCE: The Life of Games & the Game of Life" (Springer-Verlag; Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008), in which Professor Marques de Sá wrote:

"If there were no phenomena with unforeseeable outcomes, phenomena with an element of chance, all temporal cause–effect sequences would be completely deterministic. In this way, with sufficient information, the events of our daily lives would be totally predictable, whether it be the time of arrival of the train tomorrow or the precise nature of what one will be doing at 5.30 pm on 1 April three years from now."


3. The Professor seems to be saying, in the first sentence, that a set of phenomena (i.e. events) in which one or more events take place before and lead to other necessary, inescapably unavoidable results is "a deterministic sequence." Moreover, someone who has sufficient information about the set of events and the things involved in each event could foresee (i.e. predict) the final outcome(s) of the series of events.

A truly chance, or random event, then, would be an event that is not foreseeable/predictable to a person who has complete knowledge about the things involved in the set of events and their temporal order.

Suppose a set of events takes place and suppose that you know what was involved in each event and the order of the events, i.e. you have sufficient information about the set of events, and suppose that I don't have all the facts or that, even given all the facts, I am confused about how they are connected and/or about their order. You, being well-informed, could predict the final result and would call the sequence of events deterministic, while I could only guess at the final result and would plead ignorance "because there's just too much luck involved in the events to be able to predict the final result with certainty." Is a final event in the set of events deterministic or a matter of chance and luck?

Suppose, given the same set of events in the previous example, neither you nor I have sufficient information to predict the final result with absolute certainty. Would a final event in the set, that you could have predicted if you had had sufficient information become a lucky or unlucky result just because you don't have sufficient information? I think not.




@KelseyR , here's a "nudge" for ya, kiddo.

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Love what i say.png


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