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Against Scientific Materialism

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
So where I phrase my assumption 'A world exists external to the self', you phrase yours as 'A world might exist external to the self'?

But like me, acting on the assumption that it does exist, you get all the benefits of a modern, scientifically informed life. That simply looks like a shaded form of my own view.

When we want to discuss the nature of self-awareness, which is part of medical science's brain research as well as AI in computery, is it your view that self-awareness, the adventures of the experiencer, has special status? Or are the events of one's own mentation inexplicable in principle too?
See. In materialism, the background assumption is that physical entities are the fundamental bricks of reality, primary existants so as to say. So it needs to explain how entities like experiences can be made out of this physical stuff.
In Pragmatism, we are saying that physical entities are good models for elements of experiences that roughly fall under the label of "the external world". We are completely open as to what sort of model will be most useful to explain and manipulate other elements of these experiences ( like self-awareness, Qualia etc.). We will accept provisionally whichever model proves most useful. Usefulness is our criteria for defining what is true after all.
 

joelr

Well-Known Member
Excerpts of interest:-
Definition of scientific materialism
Many of us like to think that science can give us a complete, objective description of cosmic history, distinct from us and our perception of it. . I

No, science as a whole never really thinks that.
Sounds like a made up argument to use against science just to have something against science?
 

viole

Ontological Naturalist
Premium Member
It remains unknown and given that not all qualia are equal, they might have different mechanisms.

"Reducible to the structure of our brain" seems to be the most parsimonious first explanation. Otherwise, I really wonder what all the amount of neurons and connections is there for.

Ciao

- viole
 

Jumi

Well-Known Member
"Reducible to the structure of our brain" seems to be the most parsimonious first explanation. Otherwise, I really wonder what all the amount of neurons and connections is there for.
I don't blame you for assuming that something so complex that we haven't grasped yet, must be the reason for everything.
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
Cunning rascal! The materialists do all the work, and you sit back enjoying it and murmuring Agreeable experience, this ...
Actually some of the greatest physicists of the 20th century were pragmatists, like Neils Bohr.
Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics

Also see modern work on the topic,
How Pragmatism Reconciles Quantum Mechanics With Relativity etc -

Excerpt:-
3:AM: So does your pragmatism at work in these two cases mean that we should think of quantum mechanics as a realist or an instrumentalist theory or is it a middle way?

RH: Too often contemporary philosophers apply the terms ‘realism’ and ‘instrumentalism’ loosely in evaluating a position, as in the presumptive insult “Oh, that’s just instrumentalism!” Each term may be understood in many ways, and applied to many different kinds of things (theories, entities, structures, interpretations, languages, ….). I once characterized my pragmatist view of quantum mechanics as presenting a middle way between realism and instrumentalism. But by adopting one rather than another use of the terms ‘realism’ and ‘instrumentalism’ one can pigeon hole my view under either label.

In this pragmatist view, quantum probabilities do not apply only to results of measurements. This distinguishes the view from any Copenhagen-style instrumentalism according to which the Born rule assigns probabilities only to possible outcomes of measurements, and so has nothing to say about unmeasured systems. An agent may use quantum mechanics to adjust her credences concerning what happened to the nucleus of an atom long ago on an uninhabited planet orbiting a star in a galaxy far away, provided only that she takes this to have happened in circumstances when that nucleus’s quantum state suffered suitable environmental decoherence.

According to one standard usage, instrumentalism in the philosophy of science is the view that a theory is merely a tool for systematizing and predicting our observations. For the instrumentalist, nothing a theory supposedly says about unobservable structures lying behind but responsible for our observations should be considered significant. Moreover, instrumentalists characteristically explain this alleged lack of significance in semantic or epistemic terms: claims
about unobservables are meaningless, reducible to statements about observables, eliminable from a theory without loss of content, false, or (at best) epistemically optional even for one who accepts the theory. My pragmatist view makes no use of any distinction between observable and unobservable structures, so to call it instrumentalist conflicts with this standard usage.

In this view, quantum mechanics does not posit novel, unobservable structures corresponding to quantum states, observables, and quantum probabilities; these are not physical structures at all. Nevertheless, claims about them in quantum mechanics are often perfectly significant, and many are true. This pragmatist view does not seek to undercut the semantic or epistemic status of such claims, but to enrich our understanding of their non-representational function within the theory and to show how they acquire the content they have.

There is a widespread view that the role of the wave-function (or more general mathematical object) is to represent a novel physical structure—the quantum state—whose existence is evidenced by the theory’s success. In this view, a wave-function represents a physical structure that either exists independently of the more familiar physical systems to which claims about positions, spin etc. pertain or else grounds their existence and properties. From this realist perspective, it may seem natural to label as instrumentalist any approach opposed to that account of the quantum state. But a pragmatist should concede the reality of the quantum state; its existence follows trivially from the truth of quantum claims ascribing quantum states to systems. What he should deny is that quantum state ascriptions are true independently of or prior to the true magnitude claims that (in his view) back them. A more radical pragmatist would reject the representationalist presupposition of this realist/instrumentalist dilemma: the assumption that mere representation is both a (key) function of a novel element of theoretical structure and figures centrally in an account of its content. The truth of a quantum state ascription trivially implies that a wave-function represents something, much as the truth of ‘1+ 1=2’ implies that ‘1’ represents the number one. By eschewing a ‘thicker’ notion of representation, this more radical pragmatist could seek to undermine the view that representation of a tolerably insubstantial sort could either be a non-perspectival function of an element of theoretical structure or usefully appealed to in an account of its content. I’m not presently convinced you have to be so radical to understand the significance of the quantum revolution!
 
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atanu

Member
Premium Member
That's why it's phrased as it is.
But physical reality is what we know it to be for the time being. Otherwise physical reality would have to be described in absolute statements, and the only one of those is not about physics.

Truth is not absolute. It changes across time, as our best understanding changes. Therefore from our PoV, the only one we have, objective reality changes. It was once true, for example, that the earth was flat. That became untrue only retrospectively.

I grant that my knowledge of external reality rests on physical propositions which though successfully tested by repeated demonstration are derived by empiricism and induction and therefore can't be shown to be absolute, hence are always tentative.

The system that produced them, the branch of reasoned enquiry called 'scientific method', is however by far the most successful means we know of exploring, describing, and seeking to explain the world external to the self ─ reality ─ and its workings. Its findings, while tentative, nonetheless are good enough to produce modern medicines, map and describe the human brain, put rovers of Mars, make cleaner engines, and so on. Anyone who flies in a plane, gets a flu shot, operates a computer (and a huge list of et ceteras) demonstrates faith in scientific method and the technologies that flow from it.

In other words, for all that its findings are tentative, it works extremely well ─ so well that it has no credible rival.

Even when the question is, What is consciousness, and how does it work?
I assume a world exists external to the self, that our senses are capable of informing us of it, and that reason is a valid tool. I note that everyone I meet implicitly shares at least the first two of these assumptions.

Those of us who seek to understand the external world by reasoned enquiry would never suggest that we can know it independently of our thought processes ─ it would be a contradiction in terms.
We are alive because of the interdependent systems of biochemical processes provided by our bodies. We cease to be alive, we cease to exist, when those systems irreversibly fail.

Sir. I see nothing new there. You agree that you have to resort to several assumptions and those same assumptions become conclusions. There is no answer to the OP's below argument:

From OP
On the other hand, if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.

Our consciousness is the product of our working brain. This is easy to demonstrate ─ no brain, no consciousness. No life, no working brain.
Some true statements are neutral, some are conducive to peace, and some are not eg the world is warming to perilous levels. What is left to discuss?

This is an example of the assumption becoming presumption and then a conclusion.

With death of an individual, an instant of life-consciousness is terminated/transformed. When a bulb is fused, we do not say "light has died". We are likely to say so if we are unaware that electricity that lights up a light bulb is distinct from the bulb.

Death of a particular instant of life-consciousness is not end of life-consciousness, which continues unabated. It is obvious. But it will not be obvious to those who have assumed 'materialism' to be true and then concluded that working of material brain generates consciousness. If the working of brain was the source-cause of consciousness, then what makes the brain work?
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Sir. I see nothing new there. You agree that you have to resort to several assumptions and those same assumptions become conclusions.
No, they remain assumptions, as long as no inconsistency follows.

And so far, no inconsistency follows.

Besides, by posting here, you show that they're your assumptions too. This suggests that, whatever is the difference between our views, it's not those assumptions.
There is no answer to the OP's below argument:
if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.
'Physical reality' means the world external to the self, the realm of the physical sciences, the set of all things with objective existence, nature ─ as we understand them now, not at any future time.

Our understanding of reality, hence of truth, changes ─ for example, the statement 'At least one of the possible versions of the Higgs boson exists' is now true, whereas until 2013 it wasn't true. Going the other way, 'The lumeniferous ether exists' was true until Michelson-Morley (1887), and shortly after that it wasn't true.

So 'physical reality' does NOT mean reality according to some future physics.

And since no complete physics is anticipated under any model I'm aware of, it also does NOT mean reality according to some complete physics.
With death of an individual, an instant of life-consciousness is terminated/transformed.
Death is the irreversible failure of the interconnected biochemical systems of the body that make life possible. The pattern they support then collapses, the organs including the brain cease to function and that's that.
When a bulb is fused, we do not say "light has died".
When we're speaking formally, we say 'The bulb has failed'. (When we're speaking informally, we might say of a phone, 'the line is dead'.)
Death of a particular instant of life-consciousness is not end of life-consciousness, which continues unabated. It is obvious. But it will not be obvious to those who have assumed 'materialism' to be true and then concluded that working of material brain generates consciousness. If the working of brain was the source-cause of consciousness, then what makes the brain work?
Anything that is obvious will be obvious even to materialists. And the survival of consciousness after the biological functions which make consciousness possible have ceased to exist is an incoherent statement.
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
No, they remain assumptions, as long as no inconsistency follows.

And so far, no inconsistency follows.

Besides, by posting here, you show that they're your assumptions too. This suggests that, whatever is the difference between our views, it's not those assumptions.

if ‘physical reality’ means reality according to some future and complete physics, then the claim that there is nothing else but physical reality is empty, because we have no idea what such a future physics will look like, especially in relation to consciousness.
'Physical reality' means the world external to the self, the realm of the physical sciences, the set of all things with objective existence, nature ─ as we understand them now, not at any future time.

No. Your definition includes 'from time to time', which makes your definition empty.


Anything that is obvious will be obvious even to materialists. And the survival of consciousness after the biological functions which make consciousness possible have ceased to exist is an incoherent statement.

:D

Well, that is precisely the problem. You decide that what is materially perceived by senses and interpreted by mind is all there that can ever be. Then you deduce absence of consciousness that sees/knows the mind and its movements. Consciousness is that which discerns the senses-mind and its modifications from moment to moment, including during absence of mental movements such as during sleep or in mediative stance.

Bertarnd Russel, an staunch materialist, did point this problem.

An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth
(1940), 1969 Pelican ed., pp. 156-157:

I will observe, however, that empiricism, as a theory of knowledge, is self-refuting. For, however it may be formulated, it must involve some general proposition about the dependence of knowledge upon experience; and any such proposition, if true, must have as a consequence that [it] itself cannot be known. While therefore, empiricism may be true, it cannot, if true, be known to be so. This, however, is a large problem.

...

I have no issue with science and its method. But scientific materialism is unscientific.

As I do not see any reason to further continue, I say Best and Regards. :)
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
No. Your definition includes 'from time to time', which makes your definition empty.
No, my definition of truth does not and cannot require truth to be absolute. What is true changes from time to time.
Well, that is precisely the problem. You decide that what is materially perceived by senses and interpreted by mind is all there that can ever be.
The imaginary can be imagined, of course, but I see no basis for confusing the real with the imaginary.
Consciousness is that which discerns the senses-mind and its modifications from moment to moment
I know of no science to suggest that consciousness is anything but a brain state derived from the physical qualities of the brain.

Do you?
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
I know of no science to suggest that consciousness is anything but a brain state derived from the physical qualities of the brain.

Do you?

But sir. The assertion "I know" is the issue. Do you really know the "I"? Please honestly answer to yourself only.
 

Looncall

Well-Known Member
Sir. I see nothing new there. You agree that you have to resort to several assumptions and those same assumptions become conclusions. There is no answer to the OP's below argument:





This is an example of the assumption becoming presumption and then a conclusion.

With death of an individual, an instant of life-consciousness is terminated/transformed. When a bulb is fused, we do not say "light has died". We are likely to say so if we are unaware that electricity that lights up a light bulb is distinct from the bulb.

Death of a particular instant of life-consciousness is not end of life-consciousness, which continues unabated. It is obvious. But it will not be obvious to those who have assumed 'materialism' to be true and then concluded that working of material brain generates consciousness. If the working of brain was the source-cause of consciousness, then what makes the brain work?

What makes the brain work? Fancy chemistry. No need for woo.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
But sir. The assertion "I know" is the issue. Do you really know the "I"? Please honestly answer to yourself only.
My sense of self appears to have much the same relationship to the rest of my brain functions as other folk's have to theirs.

(And let me not forget to reciprocate your good wishes.)
 

atanu

Member
Premium Member
What makes the brain work? Fancy chemistry. No need for woo.

Yeah. Fancy chemistry. I suppose that the mechanism of ‘fancy chemistry consciousness generation’ and the reason as to why the fancy chemistry ceases at all will be known at some future date? :)
 

sayak83

Veteran Member
Staff member
Premium Member
Cunning rascal! The materialists do all the work, and you sit back enjoying it and murmuring Agreeable experience, this ...
Can you explain the double-slit experiment using realism? If so, please let me know how.
 

blü 2

Veteran Member
Premium Member
Can you explain the double-slit experiment using realism? If so, please let me know how.
The realism lies in observing the double-slit experiment.

The explanation will always be conceptual, and if it's our best opinion for the time being, it will also be a true statement about reality.
 
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