Opposites: Life And Death (reincarnation, mission, doctrine, experience, philosophy)

[Lightkeeper]

Originally Posted by Paraprakrti

birth and death exist because there is life. Birth and death are opposites. So if we are to apply the philosophy above, death comes from birth and birth comes from death. The factor that causes this cycle is the life itself. Without life there is no birth and there is no death.

How do we know that death isn't a birth into a different phase? If we see life as a cycle, there is no beginning or end.

[Druidus]

Socrates also made a remarkable debate for the existence of the soul, and he also believes that most, if not all, of what we know is gained be recollecting what we knew before. He believes that recollection of knowledge is true, only because he has amassed a tremoundous amount of argument for it. In my opinion, we are reincarnated, and the cycle goes like this:

Conception
Birth
Childhood
Adolescence
Adulthood
Old Age
Death
Incarnation into the Otherworld (an intermediary factor)
Life in Otherworld
Death in Otherworld
Judgement by current God of Judgement (The second intermediary factor)
Conception into this world or a higher one

Now, if we are to say that the soul exists, we will need some proof, or at the very least, a good argument. Since I cannot say it as well as Socrates, here are some more of his words:

Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is
simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time
in which we learned that which we now recollect. But this would be
impossible unless our soul was in some place before existing in the
human form; here, then, is another argument of the soul's immortality.

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what proofs are given
of this doctrine of recollection? I am not very sure at this moment
that I remember them.

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you
put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true
answer of himself; but how could he do this unless there were
knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly
shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would
ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the
matter in another way; I mean, if you are still incredulous as to
whether knowledge is recollection.

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this
doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from
what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced; but
I should still like to hear what more you have to say.

This is what I would say, he replied: We should agree, if I am not
mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some
previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this recollection? And, in asking this,
I mean to ask whether, when a person has already seen or heard or in
any way perceived anything, and he knows not only that, but
something else of which he has not the same, but another knowledge, we
may not fairly say that he recollects that which comes into his
mind. Are we agreed about that?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: The
knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or
a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of
using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an
image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection:
and in the same way anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and
there are endless other things of the same nature.

Yes, indeed, there are-endless, replied Simmias.

And this sort of thing, he said, is recollection, and is most
commonly a process of recovering that which has been forgotten through
time and inattention.

Very true, he said.

Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a
lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led
to remember Cebes?

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

True, he said.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from
things either like or unlike?

That is true.

And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is
sure to be another question, which is, whether the likeness of that
which is recollected is in any way defective or not.

Very true, he said.

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a
thing as equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone,
but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract?
Shall we affirm this?

Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the
confidence in life.

And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities
of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from
them the idea of an equality which is different from them?-you will
admit that? Or look at the matter again in this way: Do not the same
pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another
time unequal?

That is certain.

But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality ever
inequality?

That surely was never yet known, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of
equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of
equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said.

Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Yes.

But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been
an act of recollection?

Very true.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense as absolute equality? or do they fall short
of this in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too.

And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object,
and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls
short of, and cannot attain to it-he who makes this observation must
have had previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other,
although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time
when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these
apparent equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it?

That is true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been
known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or
of some other sense. And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is
the same as the other.

And from the senses, then, is derived the knowledge that all
sensible things aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short-is
not that true?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we
must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have
referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses-for to
that they all aspire, and of that they fall short?

That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous
statements.

And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon
as we were born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at
some time previous to this?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born
having it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of
birth not only equal or the greater or the less, but all other
ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality absolute, but of
beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the
name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer
questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the
knowledge before birth?

That is true.

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten that which we
acquired, then we must always have been born with knowledge, and shall
always continue to know as long as life lasts-for knowing is the
acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not
forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us
at birth, and afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that
which we previously knew, will not that which we call learning be a
process of recovering our knowledge, and may not this be rightly
termed recollection by us?

Very true.

For this is clear, that when we perceived something, either by the
help of sight or hearing, or some other sense, there was no difficulty
in receiving from this a conception of some other thing like or unlike
which had been forgotten and which was associated with this; and
therefore, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows: either we
had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or,
after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning
is recollection only.

Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the
knowledge at our birth, or did we remember afterwards the things which
we knew previously to our birth?

I cannot decide at the moment.

At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or
ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows.

Certainly, he ought.

But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these
very matters of which we are speaking?

I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that
to-morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason
worth having.

Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these
things?

Certainly not.

Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned
before.

Certainly.

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?-not since we were
born as men?

Certainly not.

And therefore previously?

Yes.

[Paraprakrti]

Originally Posted by Ceridwen018

Sorry for being confusing. What I meant for all of that was that birth is part of life, and therefore should not be considered separate from it.

The difference in our positions is that you believe that material arrangement produces life, whereas I believe that it is the life that allows for that material arrangement. I would say that birth is separate from the life principle; that it (birth) is an external feature because it pertains to the body. I don't follow that the life principle is produced from the body, therefore I don't concur that birth and life are the same thing. Birth requires life to be present, but life does not require birth. Of course, that is when we step outside the realm of our sense perception. Because we typically only think of life as far as we can identify it's symptoms in the body, but that is our matrix; a life that we can really never see, hear, smell, taste or touch.

Originally Posted by Ceridwen018

Perhaps, but we're just battling semantics then. I think that conception is equal to life.

I think that there is a life principle that needs to be present otherwise conception won't work. And I don't follow that that principle is produced by the activity of conception.

[Paraprakrti]

Originally Posted by Lightkeeper

How do we know that death isn't a birth into a different phase? If we see life as a cycle, there is no beginning or end.

When I speak of life I am speaking of that life principle that animates the body and what is often termed "soul". So in this sense I would not say that life is a cycle. I would say that life is truly enduring, whereas the body apparently isn't. The cycle is of the body, not of the life. I don't follow that the cycle of reincarnation is absolute. There is a beginning to our being covered by this material energy, and eventually there will be an end. But of course, I follow that it is up to us to determine when that end will take place.

[Paraprakrti]

@ Druidus

That Socrates conversation is profound. Beside that it explains the existence of the soul through recollection, the observation of material equals falling short of the idea of absolute equality reminds me of how in the Sastra (Scriptures revealed in India) it explains how this material world is a perverted reflection of the absolute, spiritual world. What do you think of this?

[Ceridwen018]

I think that there is a life principle that needs to be present otherwise conception won't work. And I don't follow that that principle is produced by the activity of conception.

Then what does produce it?

[SoulTYPE]

Originally Posted by Lightkeeper

How do we know that death isn't a birth into a different phase? If we see life as a cycle, there is no beginning or end.

Correct. Whence we do die, we are born in another domain. Wether it be heaven or Hell, or the "In-between" dimension" (or wherever you think you may go), we are still BORN to that world, to start a life there. When we have finsihed there, we die once more, and then perhaps born agin on Earth to continue the cycle.

[Paraprakrti]

Originally Posted by Ceridwen018

Then what does produce it?

I do not believe that the soul is produced at all. Life over matter rather than matter over life. I believe that the individual souls have no beginning nor do they have an end. I follow that this life principle is a completely different substance than any constituent found in this universe. To put it better, that the soul is transcendental to this universe.

[kreeden]

Socrates eh ? Don't you love that Greek logic ? So linear ...

Ok , lets start with the logic being used here . First of it assumes that things are without looking too closely at them . It assumes that everything has an opposite . Such as sleep and waking . After all , when you awake , you end sleep , right ? Well , you do if you see it as being linear , with a begin and an end . But what if it isn't linear ? What if sleep and waking are just different stages of awareness ? Two parts of a whole ? Then would you have opposites ? White and black become extreme shades of gray . A part of the whole , not beginings and ends . Ying and Yang are parts of a whole . And yes , Life and Death becomes parts of a whole .

A Circle has not begining or end . It has sides , a top and bottom perhaps , but not begining or end . I'm sure the a Druid realizes this .

So , using Socrates' own logic , I could say that I need the Death of another to live . Right ? I mean I can live off raw minerals and sunlight after all . There forth Life needs Death . I can't have Life with the Death of another , even if it is just a plant . And surely something can't die if it wasn't once alive . { Socrates said that hisself } .

Now opposites you can seperate . Fire and Water can be seperated , in fact they almost have to be or they destroy one or the other . Do they not ? So we can assume that opposites will destroy oneor the other .

But Life and Death needs one another , so they can't be opposites . In fact , they rely upon one another so greatly that they have to be the same thing , as you can't have one without the other .

Ok , I'm not as good at it as Socrates was . And it is late . But I'm sure that you get my drift . If you think linear and allow Socrate to lead your thinking , then you will agree that they are opposites . If you think of it as a Circle , then no , they are not opposites , they are parts of the whole .