Knowledge (ritual, creation, experience, spiritual, divine)

[Radio Frequency X]

The foundation of objective materialism is the theory that the human brain has an innate capacity for knowledge. This is the answer to the arguments that knowledge is neither innate (which it is not), nor can it be learned or understood without prior knowledge. Aristotle writes in his Analytica Posteriora, “So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extend of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception” (31-36).

The brains capacity for sense-perception is what allows it to accumulate knowledge. Knowledge is the de facto result of sense-perception, where as understanding is a reflection concerning the experience. It was not until Immanuel Kant that a rationalist was able to create dualistic, synthetic, categories sufficient to define an innate capacity for knowledge, but because Kant’s system depends solely upon itself for proof, it begs the question. Thankfully we have the science of neurology which has vastly expanded our knowledge and understanding of how knowledge is accumulated, processed, and stored. The better we understand how knowledge is accumulated, processed, and stored, the more explanatory power we have in demonstrating the objectivity of our sense-perceptions.

What interests me are arguments to the contrary, that there is no capacity for knowledge in the human brain, or that within the human brain rests universal, innate knowledge that can be accessed through divine will, meditation, or some other spiritual activity. Does anyone have any arguments like that that they would like to share?

[angellous_evangellous]

Originally Posted by Radio Frequency X

What interests me are arguments to the contrary, that there is no capacity for knowledge in the human brain, or that within the human brain rests universal, innate knowledge that can be accessed through divine will, meditation, or some other spiritual activity. Does anyone have any arguments like that that they would like to share?

The problem with this theory is that it would be pragmatically useless and dangerous. If we were to exclusively seek some type of innate knowledge by spiritual activities alone, we would be in the dark ages quite quickly.

The trail and error system of the scientific method along with the records of these trials being accumulated for posterity is far more pragmatically useful. In the case of innate knowledge, there'd be no use for libraries and universities - we could just sit naked on a hill somewhere being worthless and doing worthless things, pretending to have knowledge but having none.

[bigvindaloo]

Originally Posted by Radio Frequency X

The foundation of objective materialism is the theory that the human brain has an innate capacity for knowledge. This is the answer to the arguments that knowledge is neither innate (which it is not), nor can it be learned or understood without prior knowledge. Aristotle writes in his Analytica Posteriora, “So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extend of having no such developed state at all. Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception” (31-36).

The brains capacity for sense-perception is what allows it to accumulate knowledge. Knowledge is the de facto result of sense-perception, where as understanding is a reflection concerning the experience. It was not until Immanuel Kant that a rationalist was able to create dualistic, synthetic, categories sufficient to define an innate capacity for knowledge, but because Kant’s system depends solely upon itself for proof, it begs the question. Thankfully we have the science of neurology which has vastly expanded our knowledge and understanding of how knowledge is accumulated, processed, and stored. The better we understand how knowledge is accumulated, processed, and stored, the more explanatory power we have in demonstrating the objectivity of our sense-perceptions.

What interests me are arguments to the contrary, that there is no capacity for knowledge in the human brain, or that within the human brain rests universal, innate knowledge that can be accessed through divine will, meditation, or some other spiritual activity. Does anyone have any arguments like that that they would like to share?

For me the battlefield over knowledge rests on explanation of language. Philosophically, there is no reason to assume an innate universal grammar etc, but something is going on inside our brains that might defy explanation through objective examination in neurology for example. Consciousness itself may be an epiphenomenon, but language is tied up with consciousness. No-one would argue that language is an epi-phenomenon. I also think there are inherent difficulties with using the mind to understand itself as an object using introspective techniques because to do so requires adopting an abstracted third party perspective in itself a creation of the mind. Interesting area.

The position that understanding is reflection is flawed, and avoids the question of semantics. It assumes semantic understanding is an internal process bound up in language I think. Do you have a position on semantics?

To answer your interest here, while it is open question whether the brain has an innate capacity for knowledge (and this requires defining what knowledge is: it is a trap to think of knowledge as out there), there seems no doubt we have an innate capacity for language. I think solving what language is will go a long way towards solving the innate capacity debate also.

[bigvindaloo]

Originally Posted by angellous_evangellous

The problem with this theory is that it would be pragmatically useless and dangerous. If we were to exclusively seek some type of innate knowledge by spiritual activities alone, we would be in the dark ages quite quickly.

The trail and error system of the scientific method along with the records of these trials being accumulated for posterity is far more pragmatically useful. In the case of innate knowledge, there'd be no use for libraries and universities - we could just sit naked on a hill somewhere being worthless and doing worthless things, pretending to have knowledge but having none.

I certainly think there is knowledge that can be obtained through meditation (leaving aside the question of innate vs learned: thinking in this dichotomous way about knowledge leads automatically onto a discussion of pros and cons of dualism). The challenge is then to articulate an acceptable philophical position which reflects this knowledge. Further it would be necessary to define a scientifically testable model based on an acceptable philosophical theory.

[Fluffy]

I am beginning to believe that whilst knowledge is possible, it is impossible for a human to know when he has accessed knowledge.

I take two things away from Descartes dreaming analogy. The first is that I cannot tell whether I am awake or asleep. The second is that there are times where I have felt certain about something but then been shown to be wrong.

Initially I gave a great deal of thought to the first and very little to the second. The first showed me that I could not trust my senses and that if I wished to attain knowledge, it would not be via these. I thought that the second simply reaffirmed this and, indeed, I did not even seperate it from the first.

Now, however, I feel that it shows me something very different. I feel that it gives me just cause to doubt anything and everything. For example, the cogito is supposed to provide a foundational belief, a self justifying piece of logic that must be true since it cannot be coherently doubted. I can, in fact, say that I have felt certain at times that I had knowledge in the cogito. Yet surely I can think of times when I have constructed an argument and been certain of its validity? And surely I can then think of times (quite a few actually) when I have later thought of a flaw that I had not initially seen which destroys the knowledge I thought I had attained.

Why then, should incorrigibility prove different? Just because I lack the capacity to doubt or correct something... whether for emotional reasons (say that I desperately need God's existence) or for rational ones (say I can't see any way to coherently doubt the cogito), does not mean that I have grasped any sort of knowledge.

Therefore, in order for something to qualify as knowledge it must have the following components:
1) It must be true in reality
2) I must think it is true
3) It must be demonstrated to be objectively incorrigible
4) The demonstration must be demonstrated to be objectively incorrigible

This, I think, leads in to a much stricter version of the diallelus and, more importantly, one that foundationalism does not solve. Self-justifying no longer cuts it.

[bigvindaloo]

Originally Posted by Fluffy

I am beginning to believe that whilst knowledge is possible, it is impossible for a human to know when he has accessed knowledge.

I take two things away from Descartes dreaming analogy. The first is that I cannot tell whether I am awake or asleep. The second is that there are times where I have felt certain about something but then been shown to be wrong.

Initially I gave a great deal of thought to the first and very little to the second. The first showed me that I could not trust my senses and that if I wished to attain knowledge, it would not be via these. I thought that the second simply reaffirmed this and, indeed, I did not even seperate it from the first.

Now, however, I feel that it shows me something very different. I feel that it gives me just cause to doubt anything and everything. For example, the cogito is supposed to provide a foundational belief, a self justifying piece of logic that must be true since it cannot be coherently doubted. I can, in fact, say that I have felt certain at times that I had knowledge in the cogito. Yet surely I can think of times when I have constructed an argument and been certain of its validity? And surely I can then think of times (quite a few actually) when I have later thought of a flaw that I had not initially seen which destroys the knowledge I thought I had attained.

Why then, should incorrigibility prove different? Just because I lack the capacity to doubt or correct something... whether for emotional reasons (say that I desperately need God's existence) or for rational ones (say I can't see any way to coherently doubt the cogito), does not mean that I have grasped any sort of knowledge.

Therefore, in order for something to qualify as knowledge it must have the following components:
1) It must be true in reality
2) I must think it is true
3) It must be demonstrated to be objectively incorrigible
4) The demonstration must be demonstrated to be objectively incorrigible

This, I think, leads in to a much stricter version of the diallelus and, more importantly, one that foundationalism does not solve. Self-justifying no longer cuts it.

When you constructed an argument and thought it was true to be later proved otherwise, did you consider contextual variation. What is true must be partially contextual. If so, all knowledge is contingent. Your ideas are valid criticism of the notion that personal knowledge as inviolable truth is possible. But I think contextual variation invalidates the notion of something that "must be true in reality" as well. I think the best we can do is say that something might be true in context.

[cardero]

Radio Frequency X writes: What interests me are arguments to the contrary, that there is no capacity for knowledge in the human brain, or that within the human brain rests universal, innate knowledge that can be accessed through divine will, meditation, or some other spiritual activity. Does anyone have any arguments like that that they would like to share?

I would like to admit that if knowledge can be obtained through divine will, meditation or some other spiritual activity that the format for containment and previous understanding must be followed. In other words, one must possess a willingness to understand and have structured a basic foundation before acquiring and processing further knowledge.

[Radio Frequency X]

Originally Posted by bigvindaloo

For me the battlefield over knowledge rests on explanation of language. Philosophically, there is no reason to assume an innate universal grammar etc, but something is going on inside our brains that might defy explanation through objective examination in neurology for example. Consciousness itself may be an epiphenomenon, but language is tied up with consciousness. No-one would argue that language is an epi-phenomenon. I also think there are inherent difficulties with using the mind to understand itself as an object using introspective techniques because to do so requires adopting an abstracted third party perspective in itself a creation of the mind. Interesting area.

I've had this debate a hundred times and unfortunately there is no way to define language or knowledge so that everyone will be agreed. That said, language is a biological capacity. Which goes along with Aristotle's argument that the human brain has an innate capacity for knowledge in the way of sense perceptions. There would be no understanding without language and with language we define identities and relationships so that we can think about things "as they are" and "how they act". While we cannot understand the mind from outside of the mind, objectively, we can understand the brain. "Mind" is the name given to our individual consciousness, but what it really refers to is some function of the brain. The brain's capacity for knowledge, for sense perception, and for pre-emption demonstrate the validity of Aristotle's argument.

Originally Posted by bigvindaloo

The position that understanding is reflection is flawed, and avoids the question of semantics. It assumes semantic understanding is an internal process bound up in language I think. Do you have a position on semantics?

Understanding isn't related so much to language as it is directly tied to the internal process of relations. Understanding is dependant on language, however. We understand things according to their identity, by their context, and by what they are related to (like and unlike). The consideration of these relationships is what we refer to when we talk about Reflection. This also includes the memory and the addition of other people's "knowledge" to our own (i.e. learning through books or lectures).

Originally Posted by bigvindaloo

To answer your interest here, while it is open question whether the brain has an innate capacity for knowledge (and this requires defining what knowledge is: it is a trap to think of knowledge as out there), there seems no doubt we have an innate capacity for language. I think solving what language is will go a long way towards solving the innate capacity debate also.

Language is far less useful than knowledge, because while we can know something without understanding it, we can't understand something without knowing something particular about it. (otherwise, what are we understanding?) Knowledge is the result of sense perception and language is what we use to think about it - understanding is the result.