Aristotle and Romans 7 (ritual, moral, the passion, virtual, mission)

[angellous_evangellous]

I was reading Aristotle last night and I came across a long passage that reminded me very much of Romans 7:13-25. Aristotle is distinguishing voluntary action from involuntary action. Like the "law", the animal nature of humans is designed to lead them to goodness, but very often can lead humans to wickedness if the person is uncontrolled and does not live rationally. In the end, Aristotle forces everyone to be accoutable for all of their actions.

First, Romans 7:

Romans 7 ESV
7What then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, "You shall not covet." 8But sin, seizing an opportunity through the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness. Apart from the law, sin lies dead. 9I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin came alive and I died. 10The very commandment that promised life proved to be death to me. 11For sin, seizing an opportunity through the commandment, deceived me and through it killed me. 12So the law is holy, and the commandment is holy and righteous and good.

13Did that which is good, then, bring death to me? By no means! It was sin, producing death in me through what is good, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, and through the commandment might become sinful beyond measure. 14For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am of the flesh, sold under sin. 15I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. 16Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good. 17So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. 18For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. 19For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing. 20Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me.

Compare to Aristotle, written 300+ years before Romans:


Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 2.1222b-1225b (and following is related...). This work is available online at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin...3A1999.01.0050. If that doesn't work, try http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/ and it is in classics.

The clearest example from Aristotle, I think is:

[1223b][1] so that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous action is voluntary. Therefore he will be acting voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be more righteous. -- From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the opposite follows, for all that a man does voluntarily he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time. But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

And later 1225a
For in cases where the presence or absence of such circumstances depends on the agent himself, even the actions that he does without wishing to do them he does willingly and not under compulsion; but where in such cases the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed under compulsion absolutely, because he does not definitely choose the actual thing that he does but the object for which he does it; since even in the objects of action there is a certain difference.

[Scuba Pete]

The truth is the truth... what was your point again?

[angellous_evangellous]

Originally Posted by NetDoc

The truth is the truth... what was your point again?

I just wanted to share an interesting parallel. Romans 7 is notoriously difficult for interpreters, and this passage will help us understand the various interpretative difficulties. I don't know if any commentators have noticed it before... if not, I'll write an article on it...

[Scuba Pete]

Ah, I now understand. It is a neat parallel!

[angellous_evangellous]

I have found more parallels to Romans 7

Euripides (480-406 BCE) “That which is good we learn and recognize, yet practice not the lesson, some from sloth, and some from preferring pleasure in the stead of duty.” Hippolytus 379-83

Plato (427-347 BCE) “... most people... say that many, while knowing what is best, refuse to perform it...” Protagorus 352d

Aristotle (384-22 BCE) “The man... who does not think the action right before he comes under the influence of passion” NE 7.2

Plautus (c 254-184 BCE) “I know what sort I ought to be, but I couldn’t be it, poor fool.” Trinummas

Ovid (43BC-17CE) “I see the better and approve it; but I follow the worse.” Metamorphosis 7.21

[angellous_evangellous]

Plutarch expounds on Euripides Frag. 841 in Moralia 446a and 33e. Plutarch writes that we must find joy and not grief in our circumstances and not be lead astray in wickedness because of a lack of self-control.

‘No, indeed,’ we shall say, ‘but you must find joy and not grief in your lot be but moderate, since Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire, Agamemnon;71 and: Alas, from God this evil comes to men, When knowing what is good, one does it not. ‘No, rather is it bestial,’ we reply, ‘and irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living.72

The association that Plutarch makes with the lack of self-control and animals is quite popular and applied to virtually every area of life. Such a person is not qualified to teach others.73

Plutarch explains the difference between incontinence (a0kprasi/a) and intemperance (a0kolasi/a) in Moralia 446a. The crucial difference is that an incontinent person is Plutarch quotes Euripides again when he lists the sayings of intemperate persons.

But the fact is that temperance belongs to the sphere where reason guides and manages the passionate element, like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, making it yeilding in its desires and willingly receptive of moderation and propriety; but the self-controlled man, while he does so not without pain, nor by persuasion, but as it plunges sideways and resists, as though with blow and curb, he forcibly subdues it and holds it in, being the while himself full of internal struggle and turmoil.74

Such an attitude surely is parallel to some statements by Paul elsewhere, but the self-controlled person would never admit to completely losing control due to the shame and wickedness associated with it.75 From my perspective, it seems that the following from Plutarch fits the confession of Romans 7.19:

But incontinence, with the aid of reason, preserves its power of judgment intact, yet by its passions, which are stronger than its reason, it is swept along against its judgment. That is why incontinence differs from intemperance, for in it reason does not even fight; in the case of incontinence reason argues against the desires as it follows them, whereas with intemperance reason guides them and is their advocate; it is characteristic of intemperance that its reason shares joyfully in the sins committed, whereas with incontinence the reason shares in them, but with reluctance; with intemperance, reason is willingly swept along into shameful conduct, whereas with incontinence, it betrays honor unwillingly.76

After explaining the difference between incontinence (a0kprasi/a) and intemperance (a0kolasi/a), Plutarch goes on to list examples of each from literature. Our parallel to Romans 7.19 is listed with a0kolasi/a.77

But the sayings of incontinence are otherwise and different: A mind I have, but Nature forces me. and Alas! From God this evil comes to men / When knowing what is good, they do it not;78 and The spirit yields and can resist no more,/ Like anchor-hook in sand amid the surge.79

footnotes:

71 Moralia, 33e-f.


72 Moralia, 33e-f. fh/somen .... a1gesqai.



73 Such a person is bound to fail as a teacher. "This, then, is the natural task of practical reason: to eliminate both the defects and the excesses of the passions," Moralia 444c. (last line)



74 Moralia, 445b-c. Compare to tame animals in Epictetus and Paul’s beating himself.



75 Long footnote here... Moralia 445e; Aristotle; Epictetus/.///



76 Moralia, 445e.



77 Euripides Frag. 841



78 Cf. James... the one who knows the good ... Plutarch follows up on this statement by noting that such a person is like one blown about by the wind, Moralia 446b.



79 Moralia 446a. Plutarch compares the intemperate person to a ship that mindlessly sails directly into disaster and the incontinent as one who searches for harbor and unwillingly crashes into a reef of shameful conduct. Cf. Paul... I beat my flesh into submission and shipwrecking the faith... Plutarch’s immortal conclusion is “For neither is the wise man continent, though he is temperate, nor is the fool incontinent, though he is intemperate,” Moralia, 446c.

[angellous_evangellous]

Both posts 5 and 6 are exerpts that I edited out of a paper that I submitted this past Saturaday for a Romans course. I was convinced at the last minute that none of the references are exactly parallel to Paul and will need more work before I used them in an arugment.